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In almost all models of economic theory, behavioral di¤erences among consumers are attributed to
di¤erences in preferences or in the information they possess. In real life, di¤erences in consumer behavior
are often attributed to varying intelligence and ability to process information. Agents reading the same
morning newspapers with the same stock price lists will interpret the information di¤erently.
Ariel Rubinstein (1993) cited by Kandel and Pearson (1995).
How do di¤erences in interpreting the same information a¤ect nancial markets? This question
is at the core of a growing Di¤erence-of-Opinion (hereafter DOO) literature. While di¤ering opinions
may exist between agents in any market, international markets provide a natural place to study their
e¤ects. Evidence of nancial market segmentation across countries has been documented extensively,
with di¤erent perceptions across those countries often cited as a source. Perhaps people of di¤erent
countries harbor di¤erent opinions that a¤ect their ability to process information relevant to the
analysis of economies other than their own. As such, the international nancial market may be
viewed as a natural laboratory for analyzing the e¤ects of di¤ering opinions.
In this paper, therefore, we propose a fully dynamic DOO model based upon international dif-
ferences in perceptions about economic information, incorporating the equilibrium consumption of
utility-maximizing investors. We assume that home investors are better at understanding home sig-
nals, and, as such, are rational about home information. However, investor groups in both countries
misinterpret the information about the other countrys prospective growth and are, therefore, equally
rational or irrational. We call this new feature foreign sentiment.
The information assumption captures the idea that, while foreigners may see home information as
well as home residents do, they do not know how to interpret it. The assumption may be motivated (in
an unmodeled way) in at least three di¤erent ways, all stemming from the hypothesis that investors
start history with priors that ignore the relationships (i.e., correlations) between the signals and the
growth rates, and gradually discover them as data comes in. First, it could be that home investors
have had a longer time to study the relationship. From this perspective, it may be taking foreigners
a longer time to learn how to interpret the home signal and, if so, our model is analyzing a long
1
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transitional time period. Second, foreigners may simply have chosen not to become informed about
the signal because they have viewed home investment as too risky in the past and consider becoming
informed too costly.1 Third, foreign investors may not be able to learn the same information as
home residents.2 The assumption can also be viewed as a natural extension of the Merton (1987)
investor-recognitionhypothesis, to which we add the explicit modelling of information processing.3
In Section 1, we review the empirical evidence found in the extant literature that supports the DOO
hypothesis.
To highlight the e¤ects of DOO, we embed our information processing in a two-country model
that is otherwise as stylized and parsimonious as possible. Each country has an output process
with an unobserved conditional mean that can be inferred from observable outputs and signals, each
generated by subjective Brownian motions. Moreover, markets are complete and all information is
public. Investors in each country have an identical set of ve assets that complete the market: a risk-
free asset, two equities with payo¤s in the output process in each country, and two futures contracts
with payo¤s marked to signal innovations. The manner in which information is processed by investors
is modelled in Section 2 and the equilibrium is calculated in Section 3.
We then ask to what extent our model can produce international empirical regularities related
to asset pricing, portfolio choices and capital ows. For that purpose, we gather data, described
in Section 4.1, to re-estimate standard empirical relationships in the literature, allowing comparison
with simulated data from our model. After examining the implications of the model and parameter
values for some traditional moments of asset prices, capital ows, output and consumption (Section
4), we evaluate the e¤ects of DOO on four known empirical regularities. Two of these relationships
have been found at the country level (Section 5). The rst of these empirical regularities is the
positive relationship between foreign capital inows and home stock returns, sometimes called return-
1For example, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) show in a noisy-rational-expectations model that, when
investors are endowed with a small home information advantage, they choose not to learn what foreigners know.
2Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2015) show that when agents are uncertain about the conditional distribution,
even a small amount of uncertainty can lead to signicant di¤erences in long-run beliefs.
3On the investor-recognition hypothesis, see also the empirical work of Lehavy and Sloan (2008), and Richardson,
Sloan and You (2012).
2
chasing. We show that our model implies this same co-movement when home investors have an
informational advantage in interpreting home signals. For the second regularity, we examine home-
equity preference,the observation that home residents weight home assets more heavily than foreign
assets in their portfolios. Since home investors ignore foreign signals in our model, they shy away from
holding foreign equity because they perceive higher sensitivity of the foreign stock return to foreign
dividend shocks. Therefore, our model generates this relationship as well.
Next we analyze the other two regularities based upon rm-level pricing observations (Section 6).
For this purpose, we introduce an additional equity from a new rm we call the home rm that
operates in the home market. We rst evaluate the nding that home rm returns depend upon both
home- and foreign-market factors. Using our extended model, we show that foreign sentiment risk
indeed generates a home-and foreign-factor model in consumption. We also show that regressing our
rm-level excess returns on the home and foreign country stock excess returns implies a somewhat
higher beta on the home market than the foreign market, consistent with typical empirical ndings.
We then move to our next pricing observation: stock prices on home rms that cross-list in foreign
markets tend to increase around this event, and expected returns decline thereafter, responses often
attributed to increased information to foreign investors about the cross-listed rms. To examine this
e¤ect in our model, we conjecture that cross-listing by the home rm in the foreign market enables
the foreign countrys investor to correctly interpret information about the home rm. Because cross-
listing aligns perceptions about the information in public signals, the resulting decline in disagreement
risk decreases the required return and increases the price, as in the data.
Simulations show that the model can qualitatively generate all four of these regularities with
varying degrees of quantitative success. In addition, the model suggests several empirical relationships
across countries and rms depending upon their sensitivity to measures of DOO. Using dispersion in
professional forecasts of economic activity to examine these relationships, we nd evidence consistent
with our model.
Overall, our paper provides a signicant contribution on at least three fronts. First, we present
3
the rst two-country general equilibrium model in which investors have heterogeneous condence
about public information. On the technical side, we extend the model by Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal
(2009) to a multiple-trees setup.4 Second, to our knowledge, this paper provides the rst information-
based attempt to explain the above four international empirical regularities simultaneously. Third,
we provide new empirical evidence that DOO may a¤ect these regularities.
1 The di¤erence-of-opinion hypothesis
In this section, we argue that the DOO hypothesis is a legitimate contender as an explanation of
phenomena in the nancial market and that it deserves examination, alongside the alternative hy-
pothesis that says that di¤erent people receive di¤erent, private information.5 ;6 Indeed, a growing
body of direct and indirect empirical evidence suggests that di¤erences of opinion play an important
role.
Direct evidence is provided by data on professional forecasters, of the kind we explore in Section 7.
Patton and Timmermann (2010) show that di¤erences in individual-forecaster views persist through
time. Based on a statistical model of the e¤ect of public vs. private information, they conclude
that such di¤erences in opinion cannot be explained by di¤erences in information sets; our results
indicate they stem from heterogeneity in priors or models.They also observe (as do Dovern, Fritsche
and Slacalek (2012)) that Di¤erences in opinion move countercyclically, with heterogeneity being
strongest during recessions where forecasters appear to place greater weight on their prior beliefs.It
would be hard to imagine that more private information induces forecasters to disagree more during
4Cochrane, Longsta¤ and Santa Clara (2008), and Martin (2013) show that this extension is already far from trivial
with homogeneous investors. Osambela (2015) considers a model with two trees, DOO, and funding liquidity constraints,
but with deterministic disagreement. To our knowledge, we are the rst to solve a multiple-trees model in a setup with
DOO and stochastic disagreement, driven by heterogeneous condence in public signals. Moreover, in Appendix B, we
extend the model to correlated trees, still yielding explicit solutions.
5Previous contributions to the DOO approach include: Harris and Raviv (1993) and Cecchetti, Lam and Mark
(2000). See Morris (1995) for a discussion of this approach.
6 In both approaches, investors learn about the current state of the economy, knowing exactly how the economy
operates, although they do not observe it completely. In yet a third approach, called parameter uncertainty,investors
are uncertain about the parameters of the model that govern the economy. See Collin-Dufresne, Lochstoer and Johannes
(2015).
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recessions than during expansions whereas, in our DOO model, disagreement and output growth are
found to be correlated, in conformity with that observation.7
Indirect evidence comes from the observed relationship between volume of trading and returns in
the stock market at the time of public announcements of quarterly earnings. In a sample of more than
60,000 rm/announcements, Kandel and Pearson (1995) nd that, around a public announcement
date, the relationship between volume of trade and returns is clearly di¤erent from what it is at other
times. They consider many candidate models for the treatment of information by investors, trying to
t them to the observed relationship and conclude that it is inconsistent with most existing models
in which agents have identical interpretations of the public announcement.8 Bamber, Barron and
Stober (1999) directly test the relationship between trading volume and a proxy for the measure of
di¤erential interpretations that had been suggested by Kandel and Pearson (1995). They nd that
around earnings announcements that generate minimal price changes (where many models predict
there should be no information-based trading) trading volume increases signicantly with Kandel
and Pearsons measure of di¤erential interpretations.9 In the international sphere, the dramatic
capital ow waves classied as surges, stops, ight, and retrenchmentthat Forbes and Warnock
(2011) examine make sense if we consider that home and foreign investors hold di¤erent and highly
uctuating views about a countrys growth prospects, about which there is unlikely to exist much
private information.
7Avramov, Kaplanski and Levy (2015) show that the recommendations of analysts who rely on technical analysis
are superior to those relying on fundamental analysis. They both have access to public information but the former, by
construction, use public information only and process it di¤erently.
8Similarly, earlier work by Kim and Verrecchia (1991) concluded that di¤erential interpretations had to be present
to some degree.
9Motivated by ndings such as these, Cao and Ou-Yang (2008) analyze the e¤ects of disagreement about volatilities
upon the pricing of options. Private information about volatilities is hard to come by. In a very recent paper, Jia, Wang
and Xiong (2015) compare the empirical reactions of Chinese and foreign investors to the same public news. They nd
that Chinese investors react more strongly to earnings forecast revisions published by Chinese analysts while foreign
investors react more strongly to revisions published by foreign analysts. Individual household portfolios provide separate
and complementary evidence about di¤erences of opinion. In a panel-data analysis of Norwegian household portfolios,
Doskeland and Hvide (2011) nd preference both in holdings and in trades for the equity of the householders employer.
With no return-based evidence of informational advantage, this phenomenon looks similar to home-equity preference.
They conclude that Overcondence seems the most likely explanation for the excessive trading in professionally close
stocks.
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Further indirect evidence for di¤erences of opinion can also be found in commodity markets.
Singleton (2014) observes a positive price drift (which he calls a boom) in commodities prices re-
ecting an additional risk premium during periods when there is more disagreement among analysts
forecasts. This nding is directly in line with our DOO theory, which says that more disagreement
implies more volatility in sentiment risk.
Models that rely on private information such as Noisy Rational Expectations (NRE) models 
have also been used to explain two of the empirical regularities we study capital ows and home-
equity preference. Early models about these regularities typically assumed that the informational
advantage to home residents arises from more precise, privately observed signals. For example, Gehrig
(1993) posits that home residents have more certainty about home fundamentals information than do
foreigners, thereby reducing the optimal holdings of foreign assets.10
Brennan and Cao (1997), in a model in which investors have initially received private signals, show
that foreign purchases of home equities are positively correlated with home stock returns, because
they both react the same way to public signals. In our DOO model, instead of receiving initial private
signals, di¤erent investors make di¤erent assumptions about parameters; but the reaction to public
information is very similar.
An important di¤erence introduced by our model is the endogenization of the rate of interest.
To our knowledge, all extant implementations of NRE assume an exogenous and constant rate of
interest, so that they are not fully general-equilibrium models. As Loewenstein and Willard (2006)
pointed out, this assumption implies that capital goes in and out of a storage facility that returns
the xed rate of interest, thereby a¤ecting the implied behavior of capital ows. Albuquerque, Bauer
and Schneider (2007) present an NRE model that delivers persistence of net capital ows, as in the
data.11 The serial dependence of capital ows between investors or between countries when the rate
10Many NRE models rely on the presence of noise traders a behavioral feature. That assumption has been relaxed
by Wang (1994) and Hatchondo, Krusell and Schneider (2014).
11The articles by Dvoµrák (2003), Albuquerque, Bauer and Schneider (2007, 2009) and Hau and Rey (2008) all highlight
the need to study not just a countrys international capital ows but also the gross ows into the various securities of one
country executed by investors who di¤er from each other within each country. In order to explain simultaneous foreign
purchases and sales, they argue that some US investors must be transacting with other US investors and, therefore,
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of interest is held xed is presumably quite di¤erent than when the rate of interest is endogenous.12
Indeed, we demonstrate below that our DOO model can explain only a small degree of capital ow
persistence, in part due to the adjustment in the rate of interest.
Overall, our endeavor below is not predicated on an assertion that the DOO approach is better than
the NRE approach in explaining the international phenomena we study, or that these international
phenomena provide a way to discriminate between the two approaches. Nothing at this point positions
one approach as the incumbent and the other as the challenger. Indeed, it seems plausible that both
di¤erences of opinion and asymmetric information are important forces in the market.
2 The foreign sentiment risk model: information processing
In this section, we provide a simple framework that captures two features. First, the information in
current economic variables and public signals a¤ects forecasts of future variables and hence current
prices of nancial securities. And, second, investors di¤er across countries in their beliefs about the
informativeness of these currently observed public signals.
The basic features of these di¤ering beliefs and their impact on future expectations can be shown
most parsimoniously using a model with two ex ante identical countries. Representative investors
live in each of the two countries. The countries are completely integrated in that they are open to
international trade in securities and in a single, perishable good. Investors in each country are initially
endowed with one share of their own output process, itself initialized at the value 1. The nancial
market is complete.
introduce two types of investors within a country. In our paper, by contrast, we consider transactions on only one rm
per country, summarizing the net securities transactions within that country. In principle, our dynamic equilibrium
could also be extended to any number of investors and securities. This extension would necessarily complicate the model
and likely make the DOO channel less transparent. We therefore leave this topic for future research.
12Admittedly, our rate of interest is too volatile (see Panel A of Table 2). The sentiment-risk model produces too
much volatility in one place and/or not quite enough in another, which is why some articles on the subject have either
examined the equity market without looking at the bond market or vice-versa.
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2.1 Exogenous outputs and public signals
The output delivered by Country i 2 fA;Bg at time t is denoted i;tdt: The stochastic process for
i;t is
di;t
i;t
= fi;tdt+ dz

i;t; i 2 fA;Bg ; (1)
where zi are Brownian motions under the objective probability measure, which governs empirical
realizations of the process. The conditional growth rates fi;t of outputs are also stochastic:
dfi;t = 
 
f   fi;t

dt+ fdz
f
i;t; i 2 fA;Bg ; (2)
where  > 0 and zfi are also Brownian motions under the objective probability measure.
Neither the conditional growth rates of outputs fi nor the z shocks are observed by any investor.
All investors must estimate, or lter out, the current value of fi in order to determine the way
future conditional mean growth rates a¤ect forward-looking asset prices. They estimate this value by
observing current outputs and two public signals (sA; sB). The signals follow the processes
dsi;t = dz
f
i;t +
q
1  2dzsi;t; i 2 fA;Bg ; (3)
where jj 2 [0; 1] and where zsi is a third pair of Brownian motions, under the objective probability
measure as well. The term dzfi;t in the stochastic di¤erential equation for the signals means that the
signals are truly informative about output growth shocks dzfi;t.
For expositional purposes, we describe in the text the model assuming that the six Brownian
motions

zA;t; z
f
A;t; z
s
A;t;z

B;t; z
f
B;t; z
s
B;t

are independent of each other. As we show below, this inde-
pendence, together with symmetry, provides a signicantly simplied version of our model with an
intuitive solution. For our quantitative analysis below, we allow for cross-country output correlation,
however. Details of the solution with output correlation are provided in Appendix B.
Note that, in these output and signal processes, the parameters are identical across countries for
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symmetry. Thus, the volatility of the outputs and conditional growth rates,  and f , the long-
run means of the conditional growth rates and their mean reversion parameters, f and , and the
information in the signal, , do not depend upon the country.
2.2 Benchmark beliefs: the viewpoint of the econometrician
In the information model we develop below, no investor knows the true state of the economy. We
consider as a benchmark the perspective taken by a nonexistent being who interprets data correctly
and whom we call the econometrician.This abstract agent is not a participant in our economy. As in
Xiong and Yan (2010), the econometrician observes the same information as do both sets of investors.
Like the investors of both countries, the econometrician does not observe the true conditional growth
rate of outputs and must lter out this process. The econometricians measure, therefore, is not
the same as the objective probability measure under which we wrote Equations (1), (2) and (3).
The di¤erence between the two measures is the observation or non observation of state variables,
ffi;tgi2fA;Bg.
We assume, however, that the econometrician knows the true structure of the economy (Equations
(1), (2) and (3)). Accordingly, the econometrician lters the signal process under the hypothesis stated
in Equation (3). We formulate the probability measures of home and foreign groups as deviations
from the econometricians probability measure.
To calculate the econometricians probability measure, we rewrite the stochastic di¤erential equa-
tions in terms of processes that are Brownian motions under his probability measure. For this purpose,
we dene the four-dimensional process wEt =

wEA;t; w
E
B ;t
; wEsA;t; w
E
sB ;t
|
, where each of the elements
of wEt corresponds to a Brownian motion of each of the four observed variables under the probability
measure of the econometrician. Dening bfEi;t as the conditional mean of the growth rate of output
in Country i as estimated by the econometrician, we use ltering theory (see Lipster and Shiryaev
(2000, Theorem 12.7, page 36)) to compute these conditional expected values. For i 2 fA;Bg, these
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expectations are given by
d bfEi;t =  f   bfEi;t dt+ E dwEi;t + fdwEsi;t; (4)
where the number E is the steady-state variance of the econometricians forecast errors bfEA   fA andbfEB   fB, these variances being equal to each other by virtue of symmetry:
E , 2
0@s2 +  1  2 2f
2
  
1A : (5)
This variance would normally be a deterministic function of time. But for simplicity we assume, as
did Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009), that there has been a
su¢ ciently long period of learning for people of both countries to converge to their long-run level of
variance, independent of their prior.
Equation (4) shows how the econometrician lters out the conditional growth rates based upon
observations of outputs and signals. When he sees an increase in the output of Country i, he updates
his estimate of the conditional mean growth rate by the ratio of its steady state variance E and the
variance of the output . When he sees an increase in the signal of Country i, he increases his view
of fi;t according to f , the information precision in the signal about this growth rate.
By denition of the growth rates bfEA;t and bfEB;t, we can then write under the econometricians
measure:
di;t
i;t
= bfEi;tdt+ dwEi;t; i 2 fA;Bg : (6)
2.3 The investorsviewpoints
The di¤erence in information processing by the investors of the two countries is implemented as
follows. Investors in CountryA perform their ltering under the belief that the signal sA has the correct
conditional correlation with fA but they believe incorrectly that the signal sB has zero correlation
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with fB: The modelthey have in mind is
dsA;t = dz
f
A;t +
q
1  2dzsA;t, dsB;t = dzsB;t: (7)
Notice that investors in Country A have the same model of signal sA as the econometrician (incorpo-
rating the true correlation  in Equation (3)) but a di¤erent one (incorporating a correlation equal
to zero) for the signal sB. Symmetrically, the modelthat investors of Country B have in mind is
dsA;t = dz
s
A;t, dsB;t = dz
f
B;t +
q
1  2dzsB;t: (8)
Dening bf ij as the conditional mean of the output growth in Country j as estimated by investors
in Country i; we implement ltering theory one more time to write
d bf ii;t =  f   bf ii;t dt+ E2

di;t
i;t
  bf ii;tdt+ fdsi;t; (9)
d bf ij;t =  f   bf ij;t dt+ 2

dj;t
j;t
  bf ij;tdt ; i 6= j; (10)
where the number  is the steady-state variance of the transnationalforecast errors bfBA   fA andbfAB   fB, their variances being equal to each other by virtue of symmetry:
 = E

=0
= 2
0@s2 + 2f
2
  
1A :
Note from Equation (5) that E decreases as the information in the signal measured by 2 rises
toward one. Intuitively, the signal si allows the econometrician and investors in Country i to get a
more precise estimate of fi, thereby reducing the steady-state variance for investors in Country is
estimate. By contrast, investors in Country j 6= i ignore the information in the signal si and thereby
attribute more of the variability to fi: The result is a relationship we use below:
Proposition 1 The steady-state variance of the forecast error of the home-output growth rate made
11
by home investors is lower than the steady-state variance of the same forecast error made by foreign
investors; i.e., E <  = E

=0
.
Since the econometricians hypothesis about signals is not in line with that of investors in any of
the two countries, di¤erences in beliefs are generated. We dene the disagreements between the
econometrician and the investors as
bgji  bfEi;t   bf ji;t; i; j 2 fA;Bg : (11)
In principle, bgji stands for two pairs of disagreements for each countrys investor. However, the
investors agree with the econometrician about the estimate of the conditional growth rate of their
own output. Therefore, bgAA  bfEA;t  bfAA;t = 0 and bgBB = bfEB;t  bfBB;t = 0 so that only bgBA  bfEA;t  bfBA;t andbgAB  bfEB;t   bfAB;t, the disagreements between the econometrician and the foreign investors forecast
of the home output growth rate, move over time.13 Using equations (9), (10) and (11) we get the
dynamics for the disagreements
dbgji;t =   + 2
bgji;tdt+ E    dwEi;t + fdwEsi;t; i 6= j; i; j 2 fA;Bg : (12)
The econometricians and investors lters in Equations (4) and (10), respectively, make clear the
drivers for the disagreements in Equation (12). On the one hand, a positive output shock of, say,
Country A, dwEA;t, causes the econometrician to increase his estimate
bfEA according to E . This
same output change induces investors in Country B to increase their estimate by 


. Recall that
 > E (Proposition 1): because these investors ignore the signal information, they update their
estimate by more than the econometrician (and more than investors in Country A). Thus, Country
B investors over-adjust their estimate of Country A output growth in response to its output shock
13When output is correlated, however, both pairs of disagreement move over time and are jointly persistent. See
Appendix B for details.
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and the disagreement between these investors and the econometrician declines, dbgBA;t < 0: Given
the denition in Equation (11), this relationship means that Country B investors become relatively
optimistic about Country A output. On the other hand, an increase in the signal dwEsA;t induces the
econometrician to increase his estimate of the conditional mean bfEA in Equation (4). Since Country
B investors ignore the signal information, the signal increases the disagreement about Country A
output, dbgBA;t > 0. Country B investors become relatively pessimistic about Country A. This insight
leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Foreign investors under-adjust their estimate of home output growth in response to
home signal shocks and over-adjust their estimate of home output growth in response to home output
shocks. By contrast, home investors adjust properly their own output growth rate estimate in response
to both home output and home signal shocks.
We now derive the changes in measures between the econometrician and investors. For this
purpose, consider also a set of four-dimensional processes for each country that is Brownian under
the probability measure of investors in Country j; wjt =

wjA;t; w
j
B ;t
; wjsA;t; w
j
sB ;t

; j 2 fA;Bg. These
processes di¤er from the econometricians according to
dwEi;t = dw
j
i;t
 
bgji;t

dt, dwEsi;t = dw
i
si;t: (13)
The probabilities of events will look di¤erent from the point of view of the econometrician and the
investors in the two countries. The change in measure between the sets of Brownians perceived by the
econometrician, wEt , and by the investor in country j, w
j
t , indicates the evolution of their di¤erence
in beliefs. Based on Equation (13), we can apply Girsanovs theorem to obtain the changes from the
probability measure of the econometrician to those of investors in Country A and B. Doing so implies
that the ratios of probability beliefs between these countries evolve according to:
dA;t =  
bgAB;t

A;tdw
E
B ;t
, dB;t =  
bgBA;t

B;tdw
E
A;t
: (14)
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We give the ratio of beliefs i the picturesque name of Country i foreign sentiment or, more
generally, foreign sentiment risk. By contrast the stochastic term in the disagreement equation (12)
is referred to as disagreement risk. Equations (14) show the following:
Proposition 3 The foreign sentiment risk of the investors of one country is perfectly correlated with
the output shock of the other country (with the sign of the perfect correlation being opposite to the
sign of current disagreement).
Notice that the ratios of probability beliefs are not impacted by signal shocks. Also, the evolution
of A;t does not depend upon the Country A output shock since the econometrician and the Country
A investors agree about the lter of that process.14 The change of measure between an investor of a
country and the econometrician is perfectly (positively or negatively) correlated with the output in
the other country. Disagreements bgAB;t and bgBA;t are the drivers of the instantaneous volatilities of the
foreign sentiment variables. For example, A;t depends upon realizations of the output in Country
B; according to dwEB ;t: The size of this e¤ect depends upon the current disagreement between the
econometrician and investors in Country A, bgAB;t: If investors in Country A are currently optimistic
about Country B, then bgAB;t < 0: Since Country A investors over-adjust their estimate of Country B
output growth in response to its output realizations, this response will further increase the di¤erence
in probabilities and A;t increases.
The Markovian system comprised of Equations (4), (6), (12), and (14) completely characterizes
the dynamics of eight exogenous state variables that drive the economy, dened by the vector: Yt 
A;t; bfEA;t; bgBA;t; B;t; B;t; bfEB;t; bgAB;t; A;t|. However, since outputs are uncorrelated, the rst four
components of the vector are only driven by the Brownians on the output and signal of Country A,
while the last four components of the vector are driven by the corresponding Brownians for Country
14When output is correlated, however, these correlations generate disagreement between each investor and the econo-
metrician about both output growth rates. See Appendix B for details.
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B. Therefore, the state vector can be written as two independent processes: Yt = fYA;t; YB;tg where
Yi;t =
n
i;t; bfEi;t; bgji;t; j;to| ;
for i; j 2 fA;Bg ; i 6= j: Although they have equal di¤usion matrices, each of these two processes is
driven by separate Brownians. In particular,
dYi;t = i;tdt+ 
i;tdw
E
i;t;
where
dwEi;t =

dwEi;t; dw
E
si;t
	
;
and

i;t =
2666666664
i;t 0
E


f
E 


f
 j;t
bgji;t


0
3777777775
; i 6= j:
Thus, the state vector can be evaluated as two independent processes, each governing the evolution of
views about each countrys output, providing a block diagonal structure exploited in our description
of the equilibrium below. This convenient block diagonal structure no longer holds when output are
correlated, as we describe in Appendix B.
3 The foreign sentiment risk model: equilibrium
We now use the information structure to derive equilibrium pricing relationships. The derivation of
equilibrium in a complete market is standard.
The investors in the two countries have identical time-separable utility functions in a common
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perishable consumption good. For Country B investors, the problem can be written as
sup
cB
EE0
Z 1
0
B;te
 t 1

cB;tdt;  < 1; (15)
subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
EE0
Z 1
0
Et (cB;t   B;t) dt  0; (16)
where Et is the state price density under the econometricians measure. The optimization in Equation
(15) uses the expectation of the econometrician, indicated with the superscript E in the expectation
operator, EE . We multiply the period utility of B at time t by the ratio of probability beliefs,
B;t, to get back to the expectation under the measure of B. Country A residents face a symmetric
optimization problem.
To solve for the state price density, we clear the goods market so that the sum of country outputs,
A;t + B;t is equal to world consumption, cW;t , cA;t + cB;t. Solving this equation for the state
price density Et implies:
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Et (A;t; B;t; A;t; B;t) = e
 t
"
A;t
A
 1
1 
+

B;t
B
 1
1 
#1 
c 1W;t ; (17)
where A and B are the Lagrange multipliers of the lifetime budget constraints. The state price
density relative to the econometricians measure, Et ; depends upon the ratios of probability measure
of both countries. In fact, it is homogeneous of degree 1 in these two variables.
Proposition 4 The state price density (17) contains two priced factors: world consumption, cW;t;
15To ease the calculation, we consider only integer levels of risk aversion so that we can expand the bracket of Equation
(17) into powers. For non-integer values of risk aversion, one would need to apply an inverse Fourier transform.
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and world (harmonic) average foreign sentiment, given by
W;t ,
"
A;t
A
 1
1 
+

B;t
B
 1
1 
#1 
: (18)
The two priced factors are conditionally correlated. As we have seen (Equation (14)), foreign
sentiment A is perfectly correlated with the output shock of Country B, dw
E
B ;t
, with the sign of
that correlation depending on the sign of the current disagreement bgAB;t. Only if and when there is
full agreement today (bgAB;t = bgBA;t = 0) are these correlations equal to zero. In all cases, the state
price density in Equation (17) shows that, in the presence of foreign sentiment, equilibrium prices
now contain additional risk premia, over and above the classic premium based on world consumption.
These premia are related to the risks in individual country output shocks but not related to the risk
in signal shocks, since the ratios of probability measure are not impacted by signal shocks.
In equilibrium, each countrys share of world consumption is given by a monotonic transformation
of the ratio of the two ratios of probability beliefs. Dening Country As share as !, its equilibrium
value is
!

A;t
B;t

=

B
A
A;t
B;t
 1
1 
1 +

B
A
A;t
B;t
 1
1 
; (19)
As in Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009), the consumption-sharing rule is linear in world consumption
cW;t and its slope, !. Here ! is driven by the ratio of Country A beliefs to Country B beliefs, A;t=B;t.
This relationship can be understood intuitively as follows. When the investors of Country A have
deemed an event more likely to occur than did investors of Country B, they have bet on that event
through A;t=B;t and, when it occurs, they get to consume more. In this way, ratios of probability
beliefs act as endogenous taste shocks in each country.
In the standard case without foreign sentiment, perfect risk sharing would result in consumption
growth being perfectly correlated contra empirical cross-country consumption growth correlations that
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are typically well below 1, thereby posing a well-known puzzle.16 With foreign sentiment, however,
the presence of the stochastic term A;t=B;t in the sharing rule in Equation (19) means that the cross-
country conditional consumption correlation is below one all the time, except when disagreements
happen to be equal to zero.
In order to obtain the portfolios of the two national groups of investors, we need to derive their
total wealth processes. In doing so, we view total wealth as the price of a security with payo¤s equal
to optimal consumption. The wealth of the representative Country i investor is
W it

A;t
B;t
; A;t; B;t; bfEA;t; bfEB;t; bgBA;t; bgAB;t = Z 1
t
EEt

Eu
Et
ci;u

du; i 2 fA;Bg :
Since the whole mathematical framework is exponential linear quadratic (as in Cheng and Scaillet
(2007)), we can obtain the conditional expectation terms and thereby the wealth, pricing functions,
and their derivatives, as functions of
n bfBA;t; bfBB;t; bgBA;t; bgAB;t; B;tA;t ; A;tB;t ; u  to. The solutions for these
functions are described in Appendix A and in Appendix B when outputs are uncorrelated and corre-
lated, respectively, taking into account the fact that there are two trees in the world with outputs
that need to be summed. We obtain the di¤usion of wealth from a straightforward application of
Itôs lemma. The elements of this di¤usion are the target risk exposures of the investor.
To examine the aggregate equity market implications, we require a set of securities that both
completes the market and makes our DOO e¤ects most transparent. To complete the market, we need
ve securities with nonlinearly dependent payo¤s since we have four linearly independent Brownians
that are observable by investors.
Given the aggregate equity market focus of our empirical regularities, stocks that are claims to
each countrys output are a natural choice to make our e¤ects transparent. Therefore, equities for
country A and B comprise the rst two securities in the menu of assets, with prices denoted SA;t and
SB;t, respectively. Equities are innitely long-lived and pay amounts equal to outputs perpetually at
16For example, see the discussions in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) and Lewis (1999).
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every instant. Thus, the stock price of rm i is
Si;t

A;t
B;t
; A;t; B;t; bfEA;t; bfEB;t; bgBA;t; bgAB;t = Z 1
t
EEt

Eu
Et
i;u

du; i 2 fA;Bg : (20)
We need three more securities to complete the market. For this purpose, we choose a menu of
securities that allows investors to allocate their risk exposures to output shocks exclusively through
country equities so that the equity preference is not polluted by indirect allocations via non equity
securities. To that aim, we add three securities with payo¤s that are neutral vis-à-vis output shocks.
The rst one is the instantaneous maturity locally riskless bond, paying the interest rate rt. The
other two are futures contracts (in zero net supply). We choose futures contracts that are marked to
the uctuations of the signal shock from each country and designed to be hedges of signal shocks only.
Since the market value of a futures contract is always adjusted to be equal to zero, a zero market-value
amount of capital ow is induced.
With the available menu of the two country stocks and the two futures contracts, investors must
replicate the desired exposures. The 14 vector i;t represents the numbers of units held by investors
in Country i of each available nancial security:
i;t =

iSA;t 
i
SB ;t
iFA;t 
i
FB ;t

; i 2 fA;Bg :
Given the closed form solutions for the wealth of investors and the equity prices, we are able to
obtain their di¤usions by Itôs lemma. Dening xi;t as the 1  4 di¤usion vector of the wealth of
Investor i; and t as the 4 4 di¤usion matrix of the four risky securitiesprices, the vector i;t can
be computed directly from a system of linear equations: xi;t = i;t  t; i 2 fA;Bg.
4 Quantifying the model
As argued above, the international nancial market is a natural laboratory for analyzing DOO.
Therefore, we next examine the implications of DOO for various well-known empirical regularities
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using our model. In particular, we conduct a simulation under the objective probability measure (as
described in Subsection 2.1). From this measure, we generate 20,000 simulated paths over 50 years
with monthly time steps. Using these simulated paths, we then evaluate the ability of our model
to replicate patterns similar to the empirical regularities described in the introduction. Although
our model is too stylized to replicate these regularities precisely, Section 7 provides evidence using
empirical proxies for disagreement that are consistent with its implications. Details of the data and
simulation are explained in Appendices C and D, respectively.
4.1 Data
To provide an empirical reference for our model, we replicate basic ndings in the literature, as
described below. This analysis requires various data series, compiled to match those used in the
literature. First, we follow the literature by measuring capital ows using US net foreign equity
purchases data from the Department of Treasury. For robustness, we analyze three di¤erent versions of
these capital ows: the raw measure of equity purchases corresponding to national income accounting,
this same measure scaled by lagged foreign market capitalization as in Albuquerque, Bauer, and
Schneider (2007, 2009), and the same measure scaled by lagged US investment in foreign equities
as in Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2011). To compare with this most recent study,
we reconstruct the data for both sets of scaled capital ows over the time period of 1980 to 2008.17
Excess returns are calculated using the corresponding set of stock market returns from Morgan Stanley
Capital International and the one-month Treasury Bill rate, all in US dollars. To provide base-line
results for the international two-factor model commonly found in the literature, we also study a set of
non-US companies that are listed in the US market, using the stock returns for these companies and
their home market returns from Data Stream. These data are also used below to reproduce standard
pricing e¤ects around cross-listing events. We focus upon the returns for these rms because they are
easily traded across international markets and, hence, are unlikely to be a¤ected by forms of market
17Data availability over this period implies a smaller set of 13 countries for the foreign market capitalization scaling
than the wider range of 42 countries for the US investment scaling. See Appendic C.1 for details.
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segmentation that are unrelated to DOO such as transactions costs or capital controls.
4.2 Parameters
Table 1 summarizes our specic parameter assumptions. Our calibrated parameters are taken from
Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009). They in turn chose these values based upon Brennan and Xia
(2001) who considered a model of learning similar to ours but without di¤erences of opinion. To arrive
at these numbers, they considered a range of parameters for fundamentals and preferences chosen to
match key features of US data. In addition, the parameter  captures the degree to which home
residents know the home signal conveys information about the conditional home output growth rate,
but foreigners disregard. To highlight the potential e¤ects of DOO, this parameter is set at level near
one in the baseline model. We describe the potential impact of varying degrees of  in our empirical
Section 7 below.
To evaluate the e¤ects of foreign sentiment risk, we calculate some basic unconditional moments
for asset prices, capital ows, output and consumption produced by our model along with their
data counterparts. The simulated foreign sentiment model moments for asset pricing assuming both
uncorrelated output growth and a modied version with output growth correlation equal to 0.5 are
reported in Panel A of Table 2. For comparison, the panel also provides the simulated model results
without sentiment and those from the data. As the table shows, our foreign sentiment model delivers
a stock return mean and volatility that is close to the data, though the mean and volatility of the
rate of interest are too high.18 Panel B of Table 2 also reports cross-country consumption growth
correlation and cross-country output growth correlation. As could be anticipated from Proposition
3, foreign sentiment lowers the unconditional consumption correlation below one, shown in Panel B.
Furthermore, when  = 0:5 the cross-country consumption growth correlation (equal to 0:3) is lower
than cross-country output growth correlation, as observed in the data. Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
(1992) pointed out that complete-markets models have di¢ culty generating a higher cross-country
18The di¢ culty of matching the moments of the interest rate are common in DOO models such as Dumas, Kurshev
and Uppal (2009).
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correlation in output growth than in consumption growth. Clearly, our DOO model provides an
important exception due to the incorporation of foreign sentiment or belief shocks, which are e¤ectively
endogenous taste shocks making utility state dependent. These belief shocks are positively correlated
across countries but are also correlated with output shocks, since each output growth provides a signal
that is useful for the inference of both home and foreign fundamentals. The combination of these
e¤ects generates the observed consumption growth correlation, that is little a¤ected by increasing
output correlation.
We next consider the implications for the autocorrelation in capital ows using our base capital
ow measure and that measure scaled by market capitalization. Panel C of Table 2, shows that
these empirical autocorrelations are positive for both unscaled and scaled capital ows, with the
mean and range across countries under Data Mean and the Data Range, respectively. Simi-
larly, Albuquerque, Bauer and Schneider (2007, Table 3a) estimate the autocorrelation of market
capitalization-scaled capital ows for six OECD countries over an earlier period (1977:2 to 2000:3),
nding a range from 0.16 to 0.52.
Table 2 Panel C also reports the autocorrelation from our model for these measures. In our setup,
the international capital ows or foreign purchases are interpreted as the demand of home-
country (for instance, Country B) investors for the foreign (Country A) stock valued at current
market prices SA;t 
 
BSA;t   
B
SA;t dt

, as in balance-of-payments accounting.19 Scaling by foreign
market capitalization as in Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2007,2009) produces the change in
physical shares of the foreign equity, or BSA;t   
B
SA;t dt. As Table 2 shows, this autocorrelation is
negligible in our model, regardless of the measure and the degree of autocorrelation, showing that the
persistence in unscaled capital ows SA;t 
 
BSA;t   
B
SA;t dt

is entirely due to the persistence in the
price SA;t.20 Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2007) are able to generate persistence in capital
ows in a model with investor heterogeneity within a country. Here, for tractability, investors are
19Recall that futures, being zero-market value securities, do not give rise to capital ows. There are ows of borrowing
and lending but these would be mostly the mirror image of ows into equities.
20One insightful referee pointed out this fact.
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homogeneous within countries and the focus is on the heterogeneity across countries and on the role
of general equilibrium pricing. In our model, the excess volatility of the endogenous rate of interest
and the lack of persistence of capital ows are part and parcel of the same defect. It would be
conceivable to introduce more persistence in the rate of interest and the capital ows by modifying
the specication of the processes for the signals.21 That possibility will be investigated in future
research.
5 Portfolios and capital ows
5.1 The basic mechanism: foreign capital inow and home return comovement
We now turn to our rst international empirical regularity: the co-movement between stock returns
and capital ows. As a number of papers have documented, capital ows into countries when the stock
market experiences above average returns, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as return chasing.22
According to the asymmetric-information model of Brennan and Cao (1997), this phenomenon occurs
because foreignersprivate signals are less informative about the home countrys stock return than
are those of the home countrys residents. As public information arrives and they see home stock
prices going up, less informed foreigners speculate that home investors see in the public signal a
conrmation of their private signal, which must have been favorable to home stocks. Accordingly
they buy the home countrys stocks. In other words, the reason foreign, uninformed investors buy
more of the home asset is that they update their priors regarding the quality of the home asset after
positive public news about that asset.23
In our model, the behavioral assumption is di¤erent but the logic is similar. All investors fully
observe two kinds of information: current output growth and news about the future output growth
21Specically, one could let the signal processes have a non-zero drift equal to the conditionally expected growth rates
of output. This additional information about the slow-moving expected growth would cause the investorsestimates of
that growth to be slower moving.
22See for example, Brennan and Cao (1997), Bohn and Tesar (1996), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), and Brennan,
Cao, Strong and Xu (2005).
23We are grateful to a referee for emphasizing this interpretation.
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in the form of the signal. There is a di¤erence of perception about the latter.
Figure 1 shows the basic mechanism graphically using our simulated data for our basic capital
ow measure: Shome,t 

foreignhome,t   
foreign
home,t-dt

.24 This gure plots the median capital ows and price
changes conditional on the sign of home shocks. To calculate these medians, we categorize 20,000
simulated outcomes into four di¤erent groups depending upon the home shocks signs; that is, whether
the output shock is positive uor negative dand the signal shock is positive uor negative d.
The labels in the gure then plot the median for the specic subsample, where the rst letter refers
to output shock while the second letter refers to the signal shock. For example, udis the median
for all simulations when the output shock is positive

dwEhome ;t > 0

and the signal shock is negative 
dwEshome ;t < 0

. Then to see the relationship between capital ows and price changes, suppose a
positive output shock occurs at home (rst label u). All investors want to buy, driving the price
up; i.e., Shome,t   Shome,t-dt > 0. Half of the time this positive output shock is accompanied by a
negative home signal (second label d) a fact that foreigners ignore, which leads to disagreement.
In that case, home investors are willing to sell and foreigners are able to execute their buys, increasing
capital inows to home for the udpair. The combination of the four label pairs clearly shows a
positive relationship between capital ows and price movements, consistent with the empirical nding.
We further illustrate this relationship by simulating a standard regression found in the literature.
Beginning with Brennan and Cao (1997), a number of papers have regressed net purchases of foreign
equities by US investors on the foreign-market return.25 To reproduce the relationship implied by
this regression, we consider two types of regression. This rst type follows the relationship in Figure
1 with base capital ows. We use our simulations to regress foreign purchases by Country B investors
for the foreign stock valued at current market prices, SA;t 
 
BSA;t   
B
SA;t dt

; on the returns of the
foreign country given by the change in the stock price, SA;t SA;t dt. The rst two columns in Panel
A of Table 3, show signicant regression coe¢ cients of 0.575 and 0.734 from the model simulations
24A similar relationship holds when plotting the scaled capital ows, foreignhome,t   
foreign
home,t-dt .
25See, for example, Bohn and Tesar (1997) and, more recently, Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2011).
Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2007) consider instead the correlation between capital ows and foreign market
returns, nding a positive relationship.
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using our base capital ow measure without and with output growth correlation, respectively.26 While
this regression relates capital ows to the change in stock prices, it potentially confounds the e¤ects
of stock prices on both sides so that empirical studies typically scale the capital ows with various
measures. Accordingly, for our second type of regression we use scaled capital ows. Albuquerque,
Bauer, and Schneider (2007) scale by foreign market capitalization, providing a particularly useful
interpretation of net capital ows as the change in foreign shares, BSA;t   
B
SA;t dt, and relate these
ows to the foreign return or, in our model, (SA;t SA;t dt)=SA;t dt. The results of the Brennan-Cao
regression coe¢ cients for this version are reported in Table 3 Panel A in the columns labeled Capital
Flows - Scaled.27 Similar to the results with unscaled capital ows, the Brennan-Cao coe¢ cients
increase with correlated output growth from 0.541 to 0.952. Intuitively, when home output is high
at the same time foreign output is high (which, with the positive correlation, happens more often
than not), foreign investors, who ignore the home signal, ascribe a higher probability that the home
conditional mean is high. Therefore, the foreign investors buy more home stocks while home residents,
using the home signal, are willing to sell. As a result, an increase in home stock price is associated
with even more foreign buying of the home stock than when output is uncorrelated.
Despite the increase in the coe¢ cients with correlated output, all model implied regression coe¢ -
cients are within the range in Brennan and Cao (1997) of 0.12 to 5.13. Moreover, they lie within the
range of -0.02 to 1.04 using the US investment-scaled data set as well as within the range of 0.012
to 0.64 using the foreign market capitalization scaled data set. For parsimony, we report in Table 3
only the pooled regression coe¢ cients.
As these results show, foreign sentiment generates a positive comovement between capital ows
and returns. By contrast, there would be no capital ows in the absence of di¤erences in perceptions of
the news content in signals, as parameterized by : Thus, the tendency to nd a positive Brennan-Cao
26Without foreign sentiment, the capital ows would obviously be equal to zero, as in that case investors are identical
and hence there is no incentive for nancial trade. Accordingly, we only present results for our model with foreign
sentiment.
27As an alternative, Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2011) scale capital ows by wealth, and also
decompose portfolio changes by isolating changes in ows that are not driven by portfolio rebalancing. In Appendix
C.3, we replicate their empirical results and show that a similar pattern holds in our simulated model.
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coe¢ cient depends upon how much the investors di¤er in their interpretation of the foreign signal, a
relationship to which we return in Section 7 below.
5.2 Home-equity preference
Home-equity preference is the observation that home residents tilt their portfolios towards home
equity beyond the level suggested by standard theory.28 Explanations proposed for this preference
include non-tradeable goods or leisure, incomplete markets, and asymmetric information.
We next show that our foreign sentiment risk model also generates home-equity preference even
though in our model all goods are tradeable, markets are fully complete, and all information is public.
The mechanism by which equity-preference is generated in the model is one reecting intertemporal
hedging and it stems from the capital-ow mechanism that we outlined in the previous section. Sitting
at time t; an investor knows that at time t + dt and thereafter he will revise his portfolio. He faces
re-investment risk, which is precisely the risk that intertemporal hedging is meant to alleviate, to
the extent possible. Looking at time t+ dt and thereafter, this sophisticated investor is aware of the
correlation that we described in the previous subsection. He knows that, when it comes to foreign
equity, because of his information processing handicap, he will be able to buy on the occasion of a
high output shock that causes the price to be high and he will be able to sell on the occasion of a
low output shock that causes the price to be low, whereas the opposite is true for domestic equity.
For that reason, even though rates of return in equilibrium are symmetric between the two types of
equity, he knows that he will not be able to earn as much holding and revising his holdings of foreign
equity than he does doing the same with home equity. As a hedge against his handicap and as a way
to forestall this unfavorable correlation, he holds less of foreign than he does of domestic equity, while
still holding both for the sake of diversication. This is true as an average across states of nature (or
across simulation paths).
28An extensive literature has documented this regularity. For a few examples of studies spanning several decades,
see Grubel (1968), French and Poterba (1991), and more recently Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004). Lewis (1999,
2011) and Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) synthesize potential explanations.
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We use our simulated model to evaluate portfolios held by the home investor. Panels B and C of
Table 3 show the median of these holdings. The columns labeled No foreign sentimentshow that
the median share invested abroad is equal to 50% without foreign sentiment risk. By contrast, the
simulations including foreign sentiment risk (columns Foreign sentiment) show a clear bias towards
greater home equity holdings. The median across paths is approximately 64% for the number of
home shares held in Panel C and between 57% to 60% for the proportion of wealth held in Panel
B. The table also shows that holdings of futures are small compared to equity holdings and that the
volume of trading in futures is less than half the volume of trading in stocks.
6 Pricing issues and rm-level returns
6.1 Two-factor consumption CAPM
In integrated markets, risk factors are common to all securities and all securities are priced with these
same factors. In our model, with no market segmentation and with all tradeable goods, equilibrium
prices, such as Equation (20), are functions of seven state variables, each of which is driven by four
Brownian motions that in turn can be seen as having a home or a foreign dimension. Moreover,
Proposition 4 and the state price density in Equation (17) reveal that ultimately only two factors are
priced: world consumption and world average foreign sentiment. The next proposition says that our
model is consistent with a two-factor consumption CAPM.
Proposition 5 The following consumption-CAPM holds:
bESi   rt = (1  )CovdSi;tSi;t ; dcW;tcW;t

  Cov
 
dSi;t
Si;t
;
d
W;t

W;t
!
; i 2 fA;Bg ; (21)
where cW;t = cA;t + cB;t is world consumption and W;t (dened in Equation (18)) is a measure of
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world average foreign sentiment risk, with dynamics given by
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
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
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
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:
Proof. The market price of risk is obtained by applying Itôs Lemma to the state price density,
and identifying its di¤usion vector. The CAPM risk premia are derived from the market price of risk.
As in the standard consumption-based CAPM, a security risk premium is positively correlated
with the covariance of its return with the world consumption growth. In our model, the risk premium
is also decreasing in the covariance of the securitys return with the world average foreign sentiment.
The conditionally expected excess returns on the left-hand side of the CAPM relationship correspond
to the way in which the econometrician would collect and process data on returns.
In empirical studies, a home risk factor often appears to be priced, in addition to a world, or
foreign, factor. Our interpretation of that fact is based on Proposition 3 above, which says that the
foreign sentiment risk of the investors in one country is conditionally perfectly correlated with the
output shock in the other country (with the sign of the perfect correlation being opposite to the sign
of current disagreement). In CAPM Equation (21), the apparent pricing of home output risk, over
and above world consumption risk, derives from its correlation with world average foreign sentiment
risk. The latter is the true unobserved risk factor.
6.2 Pricing puzzle: factor model
Much of the empirical literature on international stock returns focuses not upon a consumption-
based CAPM, but rather on the factor structure of the returns. In this literature, international rm
returns appear to depend upon home factors as well as foreign or world factors, an observation often
interpreted as evidence for market segmentation or non-tradeable risks.29 Moreover, the beta on the
29For studies nding home and foreign factors in returns and the related debate on the number of factors, see Agmon
(1973), Lessard (1976), Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994), Cavaglia, Brightman and Aked (2000), Cavaglia and Moroz
(2002), Brooks and Del Negro (2005, 2006), and Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2009). For evidence that the factors are
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home market is typically higher than that on the foreign market.
To evaluate this relationship in our model, we now introduce a new Firm C in Country A with
an output process similar to that of A and B. The dynamics of Firm Cs output and conditional
expected output growth rate are
dC;t
C;t
= fC;tdt+ dz

C;t;
dfC;t =  
 
fC;t   f

dt+ fdz
f
C;t;
where zC;t and dz
f
C;t are independent Brownian motions under the objective probability measure.
Similarly to A and B, investors also observe a signal about the output growth rate. Further assump-
tions and notational details are spelled out in Appendix E. Since rm C is listed in Country A,
investors of Country A process properly the signal that is correlated with the output growth of rm
C while investors of Country B ignore it.
With this expanded model, we examine the regression relationship of individual rm returns on
home and foreign markets using our simulated data for the uncorrelated output model.30 Specically,
we regress individual Firm Cs stock excess return, dSC+CdtSC   rtdt, on the corresponding Country A
stock excess return dSA+AdtSA   rtdt, and Country B stock excess return,
dSB+Bdt
SB
  rtdt.31 Panel A of
Table 4 shows the results of the two factor regressions on our simulated data as well as our estimates
based upon the company return data. Without foreign sentiment, the symmetry assumed in our model
implies foreign and home factors have the same betas. However, the di¤erence of interpretation of
signals captured by  in our model generates foreign sentiment risk. When this risk is present, the
beta on the foreign factor is smaller than the beta on the home factor, the qualitative implication of
the empirical evidence. Accordingly, in Section 7 below we show empirically that the tendency for
related to market segmentation, see Bekaert and Harvey (1995), among others.
30The signicantly greater computational burden of adding another rm prohibits simulations for the correlated
outputs case.
31The return on the stock market index of Country A would normally include rm C: However, in our regression of
dSC+cdt
SC
  rdt on the country A index excess return, we exclude Firm C in the index for the stock market of Country
A, as this would bias the beta against that index.
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home and foreign betas to di¤er is greater for rm returns that are more sensitive to variations in the
dispersion of forecasters views.
6.3 Abnormalcross-listing returns
Cross-listing events present another feature of international security-return behavior, often associated
with di¤ering economic perceptions across countries. At the time foreign rms list in home markets,
the returns on equity shares of the cross-listing rm become abnormally high relative to the market,
generally between 1:5% and 7%. On the other hand, the cost of capital is lowered. For example,
typical estimates for the cost of capital drop after cross-listing is between 0.22% and 1.3%.32 An
oft-cited explanation for these responses is that cross-listing improves information processing about
the future behavior of the rm to investors in the home market.33
To evaluate this pricing behavior with our model using the motivation from the literature, we
return to the three-rms extended model above. We now compare the equilibrium in which Firm
C is listed in Country A to the equilibrium in which it is listed both in Country A and in Country
B: To capture the idea that cross-listing provides home investors with increased ability to process
information about the foreign rm, we postulate that, once Firm C is cross-listed, investors in Country
B know how to correctly interpret the public information about Firm C. Therefore, under cross-
listing, foreignCountry B investors now recognize that the signal process conveys information about
the home Firm C. This assumption implies that the dependence of returns on forecast disagreements
will change after rms cross-list, a relationship we examine in Section 7.
Using our simulated data, we calculate average abnormal returnsdue to Firm C cross listing
from Country A to Country B; as described above. Although these results simply compare the
price with and without foreign sentiment risk in Firm C, they demonstrate the e¤ects of removing
32On abnormal returns and the lower cost of returns, see Hail and Leuz (2009), Sarkissian and Schill (2009) and
Gozzi, Levine and Schmukler (2008), for a few examples. Karolyi (2006) provides a survey.
33For example, Co¤ee (1999, 2002) argues that the cross-listing stock prices increase because these rms commit
to abide by the stricter reporting standards, thereby reducing investor uncertainty. Ahearne, Griever and Warnock
(2004) show that US investors are more willing to invest in rms from countries that list on US exchanges, noting that
cross-listing provides information from these rms that is easier to interpret.
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informational uncertainty across countries, as suggested by the literature.
The results are displayed in Panel B of Table 4. Without foreign sentiment, the abnormal returns
would obviously be equal to zero. With foreign sentiment, the model generates a mean percentage
price increase due to cross-listing equal to 4.487% for the rm that cross-lists. This level is within the
range in the literature noted above and close to our estimated price response of 3.418%. Our model
also generates a lower cost of capital, as in the literature. In the model, the mean reduction in the
cost of capital is equal to 0.142%, somewhat lower than the range of values found empirically, but
similar to our estimate of 0.194%. Overall, the improvement in the processing of information about a
rms growth prospects due to cross-listing a¤ects its price quite clearly but a¤ects its cost of capital
much less, consistent with the empirical evidence mentioned above.
7 Empirical regularities and di¤erence of opinion proxies
We have shown that DOO can potentially help explain several well-known international nance anom-
alies both qualitatively and quantitatively. Therefore, additional information might be found by look-
ing at empirical evidence about DOO. Although directly testing our model is precluded by its highly
stylized nature, we can examine indirect evidence by noting that countries presumably face varying
degrees of DOO about the information content in news, captured in our model by . For some coun-
tries and rms, opinions about the information content in news may be rather unanimous, while for
others there may be more disagreement. As such, our model suggests we should nd greater evidence
of nancial anomalies for countries and rms that are more sensitive to di¤erences in information
processing.
Therefore, in this section, we empirically investigate some relationships predicted by our model
using proxies for these di¤erences. We begin by describing these measures and relationships before
turning to the results.
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7.1 Data and Model Relationships
To proxy for DOO about future economic activity, we use data based upon professional forecasters.
We conjecture that these forecasters likely have common information so that disagreements about
macroeconomic predictions result from di¤erences of opinion.34 In the empirical analysis, we study
three sets of variables. The rst set is the di¤erence between the 75th and 25th percentile of forecasts
for US GDP and investment growth, both residential and non-residential, from the Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters (SPF). Although these data only provide forecasts for the US, the forecasters
are individuals and institutions from various countries, thereby providing a range of international
views.35 A second proxy for di¤ering opinions is the variance of the SPF individual forecasts for
the four-quarter-ahead GDP growth, a variable analyzed by Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) and
Shaliastovich (2015). The third set of variables includes the sentiment risk indices proposed by
Baker and Wurgler (2006) for the cross-section of US data and Baker, Wurgler and Yuan (2006) for
global data. Unlike our other measures, these variables need not directly relate to disagreements, but
we include them since they have been associated with sentiment risk in the literature. Although these
various measures likely capture di¤erent e¤ects arising from disagreements, we collectively call these
measures DOO proxiesbelow for simplicity.
Using these proxies, we can then ask whether relationships suggested from the model are borne out
by the data. Accordingly we examine relationships based upon three of the regularities in the model.36
The rst relationship is that countries with capital ows that are more sensitive to DOO have a higher
Brennan-Cao coe¢ cient. That is, as noted in Section 5, countries with greater di¤erences in views
about the information content of news arising from higher  generate greater co-movement between
capital inows and returns. The second suggested empirical relationship is that rms with returns
that are more sensitive to di¤ering opinions have a greater di¤erence between their home and foreign
betas. We showed in Section 6.2 that di¤erences in processing the foreign signal generated a wedge
34We are grateful to Geert Bekaert for emphasizing this point to us.
35We focus upon the US data because similar measures for other countries have an insu¢ cient number of observations.
36We have insu¢ cient annual observations to econometrically analyze the fourth regularity, home-equity preference.
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between home and foreign betas so, conversely, rm returns that face no disagreements should have
no such wedge. The third empirical relationship arises from our model conjecture in Section 6.3 that
cross-listing changes the way in which the investors in the newly listed market view the cross-listed
company, implying a shift in information processing. If so, the e¤ects on rm returns due to di¤ering
views about public information should change after cross-listing. We next examine empirical evidence
of these three relationships.
7.2 Empirical Evidence
To consider the rst empirical relationship, we ask how capital ow responses would di¤er across
countries depending upon their sensitivity to DOO proxies. For this purpose, we rst establish
whether proxies help explain capital ows with the following regressions: NP it = a
i
0 + a
i
1Dt + u
i
t,
and NP it = a
i
0 + a
i
1Dt + a
i
2R
i
mt + e
i
t, where NP
i
t are scaled U.S. net purchases of equity of country
i, Dt are the DOO proxies, and Rimt is the market return of country i, all at time t. Studying the
e¤ects of Brennan-Cao coe¢ cients across countries requires a cross-section of countries. Therefore,
for this analysis we focus upon net purchases scaled by US holdings of foreign securities as in Curcuru,
Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2011) because a wider cross-section of 42 countries is available
with this scaling. These initial regressions verify that the coe¢ cients on DOO measures, ai1, are
generally signicantly di¤erent from zero (not reported for parsimony).
For each DOO proxy, we then sort countries into three groups based upon the absolute value of
their country-specic a1 coe¢ cients.37 The absolute value captures the possibility that the capital
inows of some countries may be positively related to the DOO proxy while for others the capital
inows may be negatively related, but any deviation from zero generates exposure. Using these
groups, we run a pooled regression of their capital inows on their respective market returns. Panel
A of Table 5 reports the coe¢ cients on the market returns, that is, their Brennan-Cao coe¢ cients,
37The paper reports the results for regressions with DOO proxies alone although including returns as independent
variables gave similar results.
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where each column provides the sort on a di¤erent DOO proxy.38 Notably, the average response of
capital ows to equity market return increases for countries with greater sensitivity to DOO proxies.
For example, using GDP forecasts, the Brennan-Cao coe¢ cient for the Low j ba1jcountry group is
only 0.005 while that of the High j ba1jcountry group is 0.096. A similar pattern can be seen for
almost all the other proxies. Thus, consistent with the rst relationship suggested by our model, the
countries with capital ows that are more sensitive to opinion dispersion are also the countries with
capital ows that are more sensitive to domestic returns.
We next consider the second empirical relationship suggested by the model. Since the presence
of di¤ering opinions in our model generates a wedge between home and foreign betas, conversely,
rms with no sensitivity to forecast dispersion should have no di¤erence between these betas. To
evaluate this possibility, we run initial time series CAPM regressions of the excess returns Rit for
each of our non-US rms on the excess returns of the home and foreign (US) markets, RHomemt and
RUSmt , respectively, and on the DOO proxies as in: Rit = 0+HomeR
Home
mt +USR
US
mt +DDt+ut:We
then conduct a cross-sectional regression of jHome   US j on jDj.39 Panel B of Table 5 reports the
results of this regression showing that the coe¢ cient is indeed positive across all measures. Thus, as
suggested by the model, rms with higher sensitivity to di¤ering views about the information content
in news also have higher deviations between home and foreign betas.
The third relationship from our framework is that the e¤ects of disagreements on rm returns
change after cross-listing. To estimate this change, we follow the literature by regressing the foreign
company excess returns on the Foreign(US) market and the Homemarket and interacting these
variables with a dummy after the cross-listing event.40 In other words, we run regressions of the form:
Rit = b
PRERmt + b
POSTRmtIt + b
PRE
D Dt + b
POST
D DtIt + t, where Rmt is the vector of Home and
38We also examined the robustness of these results along several dimensions including di¤erent time periods, using
a smaller subsample of countries also studied by Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2011), and using lagged
returns as regressors, nding a similar pattern in all these cases.
39Our larger data set of over 500 rms allows this cross-sectional regression while the shorter data set of 42 countries
precluded this possibility for capital ows above. Note that the standard errors from these cross-sectional regressions
should be viewed with caution because they ignore the sampling error in the rm level time-series regressions.
40See, for example, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Sarkissian and Schill (2009). The latter paper provides a
breakdown of the periods into a pre- and post-listing steady state, as in our analysis.
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Foreign market factors, bPREand bPOST are the factor loadings and It is a dummy variable equal to
one if the period is after cross-listing and equal to zero otherwise. In these regressions, the empirical
relationship suggested by our framework would mean a change in sensitivity to DOO measures, that
is: bPOSTD   bPRED 6= 0.
Table 5 Panel C reports the estimates for the coe¢ cients on the DOO variables.41 Given in
the row labeled Before: bPRED , the coe¢ cient estimates on Dt prior to cross-listing are generally
insignicantly di¤erent from zero. Consistent with the suggested model relationship, the row labeled
Change: bPOSTD   bPRED  indeed shows a signicant change in this coe¢ cient after cross-listing for
most of the DOO variables.
8 Conclusions
By allowing international investors to di¤er in their interpretation of home and foreign public infor-
mation, we showed that four regularities in international nance can be at least partially explained:
(i) the co-movement of returns and international capital ows; (ii) home-equity preference; (iii) the
dependence of rm returns on home and foreign factors; and (iv) abnormal returns around foreign
rm cross-listing in the home market. We also analyzed how di¤erences in forecasts relate to the
regularities across countries and rms, nding evidence consistent with our model.
Overall, our model clearly demonstrates the e¤ects of di¤ering opinion across countries. According
to that viewpoint, if someone asked: What is a foreigner?, our answer would be: A foreign
investor is one who interprets news about home rms less correctly than home investors do.Because
of this behavioral phenomenon, risk and risk premia are created over and beyond the risk of the
fundamentals, by the risk that the opinions of investors living in di¤erent countries will in the future
diverge from each other.
41The estimated factor loadings reect standard ndings in the literature such as an increase in betas on the US
market and little or no change on the beta from the rms home market. Therefore, they are subsumed for parsimony.
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Appendices
A Transform analysis
In order to obtain the prices of nancial securities as well as the country wealth processes (needed
for constructing the portfolios), we need to compute the expected values of the product of the
change of measure with the payo¤s. From the equations for the equilibrium state price density,
and the expressions obtained for the stock prices and wealths, it is clear that we need the joint
conditional distribution of
 
A;u; B;u; A;u; B;u
| at some future date u given the current state
A; B; A; B;
bfEA ; bfEB ; bgBA ; bgAB| at current time t. We can derive a moment function or Fourier trans-
form which allows us to obtain the required expressions, EEt
24i;u
i
i j;u
j
j  i;u
i
"i  1+ j;ui;u
1+
j
i
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for i 2 fA;Bg and i 6= j.
In a one-treeversion of our economy, Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009), following Yan (2008),
show that, by assuming that risk aversion 1    is a positive integer (which can be true only when
investors have risk aversion greater than or equal to 1) and using the binomial theorem, the moment
function of outputs and sentiment is enough for obtaining prices and portfolios. While this property
is useful in our setup, our problem is further complicated by the fact that the state price density (see
Equation (17)), in our model, contains a power of the sum of two outputs: (A;t + B;t)
 1. To see
why this complicates our problem, note that, since investors are risk averse,   1 < 0; the binomial
theorem cannot be used to expand that term. Clearly, obtaining exact solutions for the stock prices
and portfolio choice is more challenging in our two-treessetup.
The moment generating function in Proposition 6 contains precisely these types of elements, and
can be used to obtain stock prices and wealths.
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Proposition 6 The moment generating function needed for solving stock prices and wealths is
EEt
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and n () is a univariate standard normal density function. The functions K1, K2, K3, B1, B2, B3,
and B4 are given explicitly in the proof.
Proof. We want to compute EEt
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a similar moment function:
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This function satises the following PDE:
0  LZ

i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgij ; t; u; "i; "j ; i; j+@Z@t i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgij ; t; u; "i; "j ; i; j :
with the initial condition Z

i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgij ; t; t; "i; "j ; i; j = "ii "jj ii jj , and where
L is the di¤erential generator of

i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgij under the probability measure of the
econometrician.
Because the system of state variables

i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgij is in the exponential linear
quadratic class, we can obtain the solution of this PDE from the solution of a simpler system of
ODEs (see Cheng and Scaillet (2007)). Moreover, because of the block-diagonal structure of the
di¤usion matrix of the state variables (as shown in Section 2.3), we obtain the solution in closed-
form, as shown in the remainder of this proof.
We have
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Therefore, we can split the required moment function into the product of two separate ones, one for
each subset of independent state variables. Since the dynamics of the state variables in each of these
groups are similar to those in Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009), and since the object is also the
same as in that paper, we obtain a very similar result:
Q
 bf; bg; t; u; ";  = H bf  bf; t; u; "Hbg (bg; t; u; "; ) ;
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and
1 = 0;
2 () = 2q () ;
3 = ;
4 () = 2q () + ;
5 () = q () ;
#1 () =
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Using this solution we can write
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i
i j;u
j
j i;u
i
"i j;u
j
"j
= EEt

e
j ln
j;u
j
+i ln
i;u
i
+"i ln
i;u
i
+"j ln
j;u
j;t

= eB1(t;u;i)+(bgij)2B4(t;u;i)
eB1(t;u;j)+(bgji )2B4(t;u;j)  ;
where
 = e"i[K2(t;u)+
bfEi K3(t;u)+bgjiB3(t;u;j)]+"2i [K1(t;u)+B2(t;u;j)]
e"j[K2(t;u)+ bfEj K3(t;u)+bgijB3(t;u;i)]+"2j [K1(t;u)+B2(t;u;i)]
corresponds to the moment function of a bivariate normal distribution:
0B@ ln i;ui
ln
j;u
j
1CA  N   bfEi ; bfEj ; bgji ; bgij ; t; u; "i; i; j ;  t; u; i; j ;
with

 bfEi ; bfEj ; bgji ; bgij ; t; u; "i; i; j =
264 K2 (t; u) + bfEi K3 (t; u) + bgjiB3  t; u; j
K2 (t; u) + bfEj K3 (t; u) + bgijB3 (t; u; i)
375 ;

 
t; u; i; j

=
264 2 K1 (t; u) +B2  t; u; j 0
0 2 [K1 (t; u) +B2 (t; u; i)]
375
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From properties of normal distributions, it follows that  also corresponds to this alternative bivariate
normal distribution:0B@ ln i;ui
ln
j;u
   ln
i;u
i
1CA  N e  bfEi ; bfEj ; bgji ; bgij ; t; u; "i; i; j ; e  t; u; i; j ;
where
e  bfEi ; bfEj ; bgji ; bgij ; t; u; "i; i; j =
264 K2 (t; u) + bfEi K3 (t; u) + bgjiB3  t; u; j bfEj   bfEi K3 (t; u) + bgijB3 (t; u; i)  bgjiB3  t; u; j
375 ;
e  t; u; i; j =
264 2 K1 (t; u) +B2  t; u; j  2 K1 (t; u) +B2  t; u; j
 2

K1 (t; u) +B2
 
t; u; j

4K1 (t; u) + 2

B2 (t; u; i) +B2
 
t; u; j

375 :
Therefore, we obtain that the moment function given in Proposition 6 is equivalent to
EEt

i;u
i
i j;u
j
j i;u
i
"i  j;u
i;u

j
i
v
= EEt
"
e
j ln
j;u
j
+i ln
i;u
i
+"i ln
i;u
i
+v ln

j;u
j
 ln i;u
i
#
= H
 bgBi ; t; u; iH  bgAj ; t; u; j J  bfEi ; bgji ; t; u; "i; j
e[y( bfEi ; bfEj ;bgji ;bgij ;t;u;"i;i;j)]+22y(t;u;i;j);
where the functions H, J , y and 
2
y are given in the proposition.
In order to use this moment function to compute the required expectation, we integrate over the log
output ratio conditional normal distribution, which is implicit in this moment function.
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B Introducing output correlation
In this section we show how to solve our model when outputs are correlated across countries. To
introduce output correlation symmetrically, we posit that the stochastic process for i;t (i 2 fA;Bg)
is
di;t
i;t
= fi;tdt+ 
0@s1 +p1  2
2
dzi;t +
s
1 
p
1  2
2
dzj;t
1A ; i 6= j; i; j 2 fA;Bg ;
where zi are independent Brownian motions under the objective probability measure, which governs
empirical realizations of the process. The dynamics of the conditional growth rates fi;t of outputs
and of the signals under the true measure remain exactly the same as in Equations (2) and (3),
respectively.
Applying ltering under these assumptions, the conditional mean of the growth rate of output in
Country i as estimated by the econometrician, bfEi;t, has dynamics
d bfEi;t =  f   bfEi;t dt+ E   eE (1  2)dwEi;t + e
E   E
 (1  2)
dwEj ;t + fdw
E
si;t;
where eE is the steady-state covariance of bfEA  fA and bfEB  fB, while E is the steady-state variance
of bfEA   fA and it is also the steady-state variance of bfEB   fB, these variances being equal to each
other by virtue of symmetry:
eE , 2
0BBBBBB@
vuuuut2 (1 + 2) +  1  2 2f2  
s
(1  2)

4 (1  2) + 22
 
1  2
 2f
2
+
 
1  2
2 4f
4

2
Sign()  ) ;
E , 2
0BB@
vuuuut(1  2)
0B@2 (1  2) +  1  2 2f
2
 
eE2
4
  2eE
2
1CA    1  2
1CCA+ eE :
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We can then write the dynamics of the output processes under the measure of the econometrician:
di;t
i;t
= bfEi;tdt+ 
0@s1 +p1  2
2
dwEi;t +
s
1 
p
1  2
2
dwEj ;t
1A ; i 6= j; i; j 2 fA;Bg :
The investorsinterpretation of the signals is exactly the same as the one described in Section 2.3.
Dening bf ij as the conditional mean of the output growth in Country j as estimated by investors in
Country i; we obtain
d bf ii;t =  f   bf ii;t dt+ X   e2 (1  2)

di;t
i;t
  bf ii;tdt+ e   X2 (1  2)

dj;t
j;t
  bf ij;tdt+ fdsi;t;
d bf ij;t =  f   bf ij;t dt+ e   Y2 (1  2)

di;t
i;t
  bf ii;tdt+ Y   e2 (1  2)

dj;t
j;t
  bf ij;tdt ;
where X is the steady-state variance of bf ii;t   fi, Y is the steady-state variance of bf ij;t   fj , and e
is their covariance:
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As in the text, the disagreementsbetween the econometrician and the investors are dened as:
bgji  bfEi;t   bf ji;t; i; j 2 fA;Bg :
With output correlation, investors disagree with the econometrician about the estimate of the con-
ditional growth rate of their own output, because the behavioral bias in their estimate of the foreign
output growth rate forecast spills over into the home output growth rate forecast. Therefore, bgji
stands for two pairs of disagreements for each countrys investor, with dynamics
dbgii;t =  
24
q
1 +
p
1  2
 e   X q1 p1  2  X   e
p
22 (1  2)
3
2
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0@ +
q
1 +
p
1  2
 
X   e q1 p1  2  e   X
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22 (1  2)
3
2
1Abgii;t
35 dt
+
eE   e    E   X
 (1  2)
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 
E   X

  
eE   e
 (1  2)
dwEi;t;
dbgij;t =  
24
q
1 +
p
1  2
 e   Y  q1 p1  2  Y   e
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22 (1  2)
3
2
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+
0@ +
q
1 +
p
1  2
 
Y   e q1 p1  2  e   Y 
p
22 (1  2)
3
2
1Abgij;t
35 dt
+
eE   e    E   Y 
 (1  2)
dwEj ;t +
 
E   Y

  
eE   e
 (1  2)
dwEi;t + fdw
E
si;t;
where i 6= j; i; j 2 fA;Bg :
The changes from the probability measure of the econometrician to those of investors in Country
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A and B are then
dA;t
A;t
=  
q
1 +
p
1  2bgAA;t  q1 p1  2bgAB;t

p
2 (1  2)
dwEA;t
 
q
1 +
p
1  2bgAB;t  q1 p1  2bgAA;t

p
2 (1  2)
dwEB ;t;
dB;t
B;t
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p
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p
2 (1  2)
dwEA;t
 
q
1 +
p
1  2bgBB;t  q1 p1  2bgBA;t

p
2 (1  2)
dwEB ;t:
In order to obtain the prices of nancial securities as well as the country wealth processes (needed
for constructing the portfolios), we need the joint conditional distribution of
 
A;u; B;u; A;u; B;u
|
at some future date u given the current state

A; B; A; B;
bfEA ; bfEB ; bgBA ; bgBB ; bgAA; bgAB| at current time
t: As shown in Appendix A (see in particular the proof of Proposition 6), we can obtain the prices of
nancial securities as well as the country wealth processes from the following moment function:
Z

i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgjj ; bgii; bgij ; t; u; "i; "j ; i; j = EEt i;ui
i j;u
j
j i;u
i
"i j;u
j
"j
:
This function satises the following PDE:
0  LZ

i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgjj ; bgii; bgij ; t; u; "i; "j ; i; j
+
@Z
@t

i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgjj ; bgii; bgij ; t; u; "i; "j ; i; j :
with the initial condition Z

i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgjj ; bgii; bgijt; t; "i; "j ; i; j = "ii "jj ii jj , and
where L is the di¤erential generator of

i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgjj ; bgii; bgij under the probability mea-
sure of the econometrician.
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Because the system of state variables

i; j ; bfEi ; bfEj ; i; j ; bgji ; bgjj ; bgii; bgij is in the exponential linear
quadratic class, we can obtain the solution of this PDE from the solution of a simpler system of ODEs
(see Cheng and Scaillet (2007)). With output correlations, however, the di¤usion matrix of the state
variables does not have a block diagonal structure, and the solution of the system of ODEs, while
in principle available in closed form, becomes complicated and is more quickly obtained numerically.
Our solution is still explicit, and it is exact up to the numerical solution of a Riccati system of ODEs,
which can be obtained at arbitrarily high precision in Mathematica.
C Data Description
In this appendix we describe the data employed in the text. These data are used for two purposes:
(a) to provide the summary measures of empirical regularities for the simulated model in Sections 4,
5, and 6; and (b) to consider how those regularities relate to various market disagreement proxies in
Section 7.
C.1 Summary Measures for Model Comparison
The means and standard deviations of the asset pricing moments in Panel A of Table 2 are calculated
using the same aggregate US market equity return and US Treasury bill data over the same time
period as recent capital ow analysis in the literature, described below. In particular, equity is the
Morgan Stanley Capital International Total Return Index for the U.S., and the interest rate is the
one-month T-bill rate from Data Stream, both series from 1980 to 2008.
The capital ow data used to estimate the autocorrelations and regressions in, respectively, Panel
C of Table 2 and Panel A of Table 3 are from the U.S. Treasury data base. We consider three di¤erent
versions of capital ows: (a) U.S. net purchases of foreign equities; (b) U.S. net equity purchases scaled
by beginning of period foreign market capitalization as in Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2007,
2009), and (c) U.S. net equity purchases scaled by beginning of period holdings of foreign securities
by U.S. investors following Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2011). For analysis with set
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(b), we use the six non-US countries considered by Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2007) along
with another seven countries for which we have a full set of net equity purchases and foreign market
capitalization over the full period. Scaling the data in this way provides capital ows from the follow-
ing thirteen countries: Austria, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, and South Africa. For the set (c) results, we use the
42 countries in Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2011). These monthly measures of net
equity purchases combine low frequency positions from security-level surveys with higher frequency
ow data. The set of countries for this scaling is: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic, Denmark. Finland, France. Germany, Great Britain,
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. Much of the general results in the
paper were also estimated using the smaller 20 country set analyzed by Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock
and Wongswan (2011) yielding similar results.
The Brennan-Cao regressions in Panel A of Table 3 and Section 7 also require market returns
for each country. For this purpose, we construct a data set of foreign returns using Morgan Stanley
Capital International Total Return Indices for the country markets, all measured in US dollars. To
be consistent with the main ndings of the more recent Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan
(2011) study, these data are analyzed over the period 1980 to 2008.
The foreign stock returns analyzed in the two-factor CAPM regressions in Panel A of Table 4
and the cross-listing statistics in Panel B of Table 4 are the set of foreign company returns traded
on US exchanges. In order to provide returns with su¢ cient liquidity as well as time series data,
we chose the set of foreign companies traded in the US by 2004 on the NYSE or NASDAQ, a lter
that provides 576 potential rms.42 The returns were calculated from the Data Stream International
Total Return Indices in US dollars for each of these rms as well as for their home markets. For the
42Specically, these foreign stocks are traded either as American Depositary Receipts or are directly listed on the
exchanges as in the case of Canadian companies.
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analysis based upon pre- and post-cross-listing, we dropped rms with fewer than 52 observations
before cross-listing, resulting in 311 rms for that analysis. The constituent companies and their
cross-listing dates were obtained from the three custodian banks for the ADRs and from Doidge,
Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) for the Canadian rms. To provide a standard benchmark using the DOO
measures described below, we conducted our rm level analysis from 1980 to the beginning of 2010,
when the US Sentiment Index data ends.
C.2 Di¤erence of Opinion Measures
In Section 7, we considered the relationship between some regularities and various DOO measures
used in the literature. The rst two sets are calculated from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF) database. The other set of measures are the Sentiment Risk Indices based upon the rst
principal components of a number of variables considered to capture US investor sentiment by Baker
and Wurgler (2006) and global investor sentiment by Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012). For each of
these variables, we use the data over the available time period, although their frequencies vary. The
U.S. sentiment indices are monthly and available through 2010. However, the Global Sentiment Index
is annual and ends in 2005. For this proxy, therefore, we generate a monthly series using the annual
sentiment data following the steps in Yu (2013).
C.3 Active Portfolio Reallocation Measures
The positive coe¢ cients on foreign returns from capital ow regressions have been called return chas-
ingby Bohn and Tesar (1997), among others. However, Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock and Wongswan
(2011) note that this positive relationship may simply reect a passive increase in the value of foreign
assets when their returns increase. They address this possibility by isolating the change in the port-
folio allocation in foreign equities that result from active changes in share holdings, an approach also
taken by Hau and Rey (2008). When they regress these active portfolio reallocations on returns, they
nd on-average much lower coe¢ cients that are generally insignicant from zero. To investigate this
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possibility, we calculate the active portfolio reallocationsspecied in Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock
and Wongswan (2011) as43
Active Portfolio Reallocations =
SA;t  BSA;t
SA;t  BSA;t + SB;t  
B
SB ;t
 
SA;t  BSA;t dt
SA;t  BSA;t dt + SB;t  
B
SB ;t dt
:
Thus, the active reallocation is the change in the value of foreign portfolio shares owned by Country
B investors, due to changes in equity holdings and not in prices.
To determine whether our model captures the relationship found by Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock
and Wongswan (2011), we simulate this variable in the uncorrelated and correlated output growth
versions of our model. We nd that the coe¢ cient on Active Portfolio Reallocations is closer to
zero than the corresponding coe¢ cient on foreign returns alone, for both correlated and uncorrelated
output models. This nding reects a more muted relationship between active portfolio reallocation
and returns, than for total foreign purchases, consistent with the Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock and
Wongswan (2011) results. Moreover, the coe¢ cients on Active Portfolio Reallocations are not signi-
cantly di¤erent from zero as in Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock and Wongswan (2011). Overall, therefore,
our highly stylized model is remarkably consistent with two co-occurring ndings in the literature
about capital ows - a positive Brennan-Cao coe¢ cient and little-to-no response in Active Portfolio
Reallocations.
D Non-stationarity and simulation
Stationarity. Existing studies on the survival of irrational traders ask whether excessively pessimistic
or optimistic agents survive in the long run in an economy in which one population of agents knows the
true probability distribution. These studies include Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westereld (2006), Yan
(2008) and Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009). These studies conclude that, although irrational
traders do not survive in the long-run, they disappear very slowly, in terms of consumption shares.
43CTWW only consider the share of equities as a proportion of foreign equities. In our two country model, we use
the same concept to consider foreign equities as a proportion of all equities, in this case home and abroad.
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In our model, both types of investors are symmetrically undercondent about the foreign signals. It
is not obvious ex-ante, therefore, whether the equilibrium we have obtained is stationary or not.
To throw some light on the issue, we obtain, as in Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009), the proba-
bility distribution of the future Country As consumption share (!u) under the objective probability
measure, by Fourier Inversion of the characteristic function of the ratio of foreign sentiments AB .
Figure 2 plots the probability density function of !u for di¤erent initial values !t. The left panel
displays the case in which Country As consumption share is currently smaller (!t = 0:25) and the
right panel displays the case in which both countriess consumption shares are currently the same
(!t = 0:5). We see from this gure that, independently of the current relative consumption shares,
as time passes, the probability distribution expands to the edges, exhibiting non-stationarity of the
consumption shares. But it does so rather slowly.
Details of the simulation analysis. Using monthly time steps, we perform an exact simulation
of the state variables

A; B; bfEA ; bfEB ; bgBA ; bgAB for which exact transition probability distributions are
known. For variables (A; B) ; we rely on a simple Euler-Maruyama discretization. We sometimes
get outlier paths. Prompted by a referee, we have veried that these are legitimate observations and
not the result of simulation errors. To conrm that, we have gradually reduced the time step of
the simulation (down from one year to 1/32 of a year) and observed no change in the histograms
of any of the state variables. We have also found no systematic increase or decrease in the Min or
the Max of any of them. The referee provided the rationale for these outliers being actually part of
the solution: Consider the process for disagreement described in Equation (12). The public shock
decreases disagreement because  > E . But a high  also increases mean reversion in disagreement
accelerating the decrease in disagreement. Therefore, periods of high disagreement that are followed
by output news that everyone follows, may look like outliers.
Although these paths occur very rarely, statistics calculated across paths that involve portfolio
choices are sensitive to them. For that reason, we resort to robust statistics whenever portfolio choices
are involved. This choice is also made, for example, by Beeler and Campbell (2012).
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While the simulation is conducted under the objective probability measure (as in Subsection 2.1),
the comparison of simulated data with empirical results remains a delicate exercise because of the
non-stationarity of our model. As a way of alleviating the problem created by the non-stationarity
of our model, we take several precautions. First, to obtain moments that are as little dependent on
initial conditions as possible, or to approach unconditional moments, we run the simulations over as
long a span of time as we can a¤ord. We chose T = 50 years (600 monthly observations).44 Second,
we draw many paths, namely 20,000 paths. Third, we split these 20,000 paths into ve subsamples,
and use di¤erent sets of initial values for the state variables in each subsample. Fourth, we compute
moments across paths at the terminal points of the simulation. Moments calculated across paths are
valid representations of the behavior of the model, whether or not the model is stationary.
We verify that the frequency distribution of the consumption share obtained from the simulation
for the 50-year horizon closely matches the theoretical probability distribution shown in Figure 2.
We are careful to impose symmetry between the two markets A and B.45 And, when we introduce
the third rm C, we run the simulation in such a way that A and B remain symmetric in their joint
relationship with C. In this way, we have a clean no-foreign-sentiment benchmark when we examine
the empirical regularities.
E A cross section
As indicated in the text, let there be one rm listed in Country B, which we call Firm B; and let there
be two rms listed in Country A, which we call Firm A and Firm C. Under the objective probability
measure, the outputs of Firms A and B are as they were before but we now introduce the output of
the new Firm C as
dC;t
C;t
= fC;tdt+ dz

C;t;
44Although we run the model over 50 years, the economic agents in our simulation have an innite horizon, not a
50-year horizon.
45For more precision in the means and medians, we have also used the technique of antithetic variates.
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where zC;t is an independent Brownian motion under the objective probability measure, which governs
empirical realizations of the process.
The conditional expected growth rate fC;t of output is also stochastic:
dfC;t = 
 
f   fC;t

dt+ fdz
f
C;t:
As before, all investors must estimate, or lter out, the current value of fi;t and its future behavior.
They do so by observing the current cash ows and the three public signals (sA; sB; sC) The signal
correlated with dzfC;t evolves according to
dsC;t = dz
f
C;t +
q
1  2dzsC;t; (22)
where zsC is a Brownian motion, under the objective probability measure as well. All the Brownian
motions are independent from each other.
Investors in Country A (where rms A and C are listed) perform their ltering under the belief
that the signals sA and sC have the correct correlation with fA and fC ; but they believe incorrectly
that the signal sB has zero correlation with fB; which means that they ignore the information about
the rms listed in the other country. The model they have in mind for this signal, in addition to
those for the signal processes of A and B in Equation (7), posits that the dynamics of the signal
process of C are those given in Equation (22).
Investors in Country B (where Firm B is listed) perform their ltering under the belief that the
signal sB has the correct correlation with fB; but they believe incorrectly that the signals sA and
sC have zero correlation with fA and fC , which means that they ignore the information about the
rms listed in the other country. The modelthey have in mind, in addition to those for the signal
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processes of A and B in Equation (8), posits that
dsC;t = dz
s
C;t:
By following exactly the same steps as in Section 2, we can show that the vector of exogenous
state variables under the reference measure of the econometrician is given by the Markovian system
comprised of Equations (4), (6), (12) and (14), to which we now add the following three analogous
equations for Firm Cs output, expected conditional growth rate, and disagreement, respectively:
dC;t
C;t
= bfEC;tdt+ dwEC ;t;
d bfEC;t =  f   bfEC;t dt+ E dwEC ;t + fdwEsC ;t;
dbgBC;t =   + 2
bgBC;tdt+    E dwEC ;t + fdwEsC ;t;
and the new change from the measure of investor B to that of the econometrician eB;t:
deB;teB;t =   1  bgBA;tdwEA;t + bgBC;tdwEC ;t :
Therefore, we get an extended vector of ten exogenous state variables which drive the economy:
~Yt 

A;t; bfEA;t; bgBA;t; B;t; B;t; bfEB;t; bgAB;t; A;t; c;t; bfEc;t; bgBC;t; C;t| where C is dened as:
dC;t
C;t
=   1

bgBC;tdwEC ;t;
so that eB;t = B;t  C;t. The structure is very similar to that of our two-rm model of Section 2.
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But there is now a third system YC;t where
YC;t =
n
C;t; bfEC;t; bgBC;t; C;toT :
Therefore this system can be written as
dYC;t = C;tdt+ 
C;tdw
E
C;t;
where
dwEC;t =

dwEC ;t; dw
E
sC ;t
	
;
and

C;t =
2666666664
i;t 0
E


f
E 


f
 C;t
bgBC;t


0
3777777775
:
Thus, the state vector can be evaluated as three independent sets of processes. For instance, the
full vector of twelve state variables eYt can be written as
d ~Yt = etdt+ ~
td !wEi;t;
where
d !wEi;t =

dwEA;t; dw
E
B ;t
; dwEC ;t; dw
E
sA;t
; dwEsB ;t; dw
E
sC ;t
	
;
and
~
t =
266664

A;t 0 0
0 
B;t 0
0 0 
C;t
377775 ;
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where ~
t is still block diagonal, a property we exploit again in seeking the equilibrium in this extended
model.
In this setting we now have six di¤erent Brownian motions. Hence we need seven linearly inde-
pendent securities in order to complete the market. Since we intend to replicate a regression of a
rm stock excess return on a home country stock excess return and a foreign country stock excess
return, we choose our menu of securities accordingly. In particular we consider three stocks: (i) a
stock SC which is a claim on the output of Firm C (C); (ii) a stock SA;C which is a claim on the
output of Firm A, taken to represent the equity market of Country A (A); and (iii) a stock SB which
is a claim on the foreign output B. As in Section 3, we complete the market with a locally riskless,
instantaneously maturing bond deposit and three zero-net supply futures contracts whose prices are
marked to the uctuations of the three signal shocks, and are designed to hedge these shocks only.
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Figure 1: Conditional medians of home-equity price change and foreign capital inows.
This gure plots the median home-equity price change and foreign capital inows conditional on the
sign of home shocks. The rst letter refers to output shock while the second letter refers to the signal
shock. urefers to a positive shocks and drefers to a negative shock. The conditional medians
are calculated across 20,000 paths at t = 50 years.
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Figure 2: Non stationarity of the equilibrium. Left panel: probability density function of the
consumption share for various horizons (in years) for an intial share equal to !t = 0:25. Right panel:
the same for an initial share !t = 0:5.
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Table 1: Parameters. This table lists the parameter values used for all the (other) tables and gures
in the paper. These values are taken from Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009).
Name Symbol Value
Parameters for output dynamics
Long-term average growth rate of output f 0.015
Volatility of expected growth rate of output f 0.03
Volatility of output  0.13
Output correlation  0, 0.5
Mean reversion parameter  0.2
Parameters for investorspreferences and beliefs
Subjective discount rate  0.1
Relative risk aversion 1   3
True correlation between foreign signal and mean foreign growth rate  0.95
Perceived correlation between foreign signal and mean foreign growth rate   0
Relative Lagrange multipliers of the lifetime budget constraints BA 1
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Table 2: Moments. This table reports selected moments in the benchmark model with and without
foreign sentiment, with and without cross-country correlation ( = 0:5 and  = 0, respectively),
and in the data. Panel A provides the means and standard deviations of the interest rate and stock
return. Panel B reports the cross-country correlations of consumption and output growth. Panel C
gives estimates of the autocorrelation in foreign equity purchases, using robust least squares (MM
estimation) for the model. P-values for the coe¢ cient being di¤erent from zero are in the parentheses.
Panel A: Asset pricing moments (annualized percentages)
Moment No foreign sentiment Foreign sentiment Data
( = 0) ( = 0:5) ( = 0) ( = 0:5)
Interest rate mean 7.62 6.35 9.77 9.35 5.43
Interest rate standard deviation 10.79 10.69 7.13 8.03 0.88
Stock return mean 11.58 10.92 11.21 11.43 11.40
Stock return standard deviation 21.79 22.53 15.08 16.75 15.25
Panel B: Macroeconomic moments
Moment No foreign sentiment Foreign sentiment Data
( = 0) ( = 0:5) ( = 0) ( = 0:5)
Consumption growth correlation 1.00 1.00 0.29 0.30 0.28
Output growth correlation 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.44
Panel C: Capital ow autocorrelation
Foreign net equity purchases
Net Purchases Measure ( = 0) ( = 0:5) Data Mean Data Range
Base 0.004 0.066 0.362 0.099-0.640
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Scaled - Market Cap -0.008 -0.010 0.205 0.029 - 0.647
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 3: Country-level regularities. This table reports country-level regularities in the model and
in the data. Panel A reports coe¢ cients, p-values of the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients di¤er from
zero (in parenthesis), and R2 from regressions of capital ows on foreign returns in the data and in
the model using robust least squares (MM estimation). Capital ows are measured both as foreign
net purchases of equity and as active portfolio reallocations. Panel B shows the value of home stock
held as a proportion of wealth, for the model simulations and for the data. Panel C gives the median
value generated by the model for asset holdings by the home investor and for changes in his holdings
of each asset class. For the home investor, the panel reports the median number of home and foreign
equity shares and the median number of home and foreign futures held. The table also gives the
median of the absolute value of changes in his holdings of each asset class, as measures of the stock
and futures trading volumes.
Panel A: Capital ow and stock return
Capital ows Capital ows - scaled
( = 0) ( = 0:5) (Data) ( = 0) ( = 0:5) (Data)
Brennan-Cao coef 0.575 0.734 0.387 0.541 0.952 0.224
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038)
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.015 0.085 0.001 0.002 0.035
Panel B: Home-equity preference
No foreign sentiment Foreign sentiment Data
( = 0) ( = 0:5) ( = 0) ( = 0:5) (Mean) (Range)
Home equity
share of wealth
0.500 0.500 0.596 0.566 0.745 0.651 - 0.803
Panel C: Holdings of nancial assets and trading volume
No foreign sentiment Foreign sentiment
( = 0) ( = 0:5) ( = 0) ( = 0:5)
Number of home shares held 0.500 0.500 0.635 0.637
Number of foreign shares held 0.500 0.500 0.366 0.363
Number of home futures held 0.000 0.000 -0.021 -0.040
Number of foreign futures held 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.040
Trading volume of stocks 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.063
Trading volume of futures 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.028
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Table 4: Firm-level regularities. This table reports rm-level regularities in the model and in the
data. Panel A reports coe¢ cients, p-values (in parenthesis), and R2 from regressing the excess equity
return of a rm (Firm C) on that of its home market (Country A) and the foreign market (Country
B). The rst two columns give the statistics from the simulated model without and with foreign
sentiment, respectively, while the third column calculates their percentage changes due to sentiment,
and the fourth column contains the data estimates. Panel B reports the rms mean percentage
change in price and the mean change in return due to cross-listing both in the model with foreign
sentiment and in the data. Without foreign sentiment, cross-listing would have no impact in the price
or return of the cross-listing rm.
Panel A: Factor model
No foreign
sentiment
Foreign
sentiment
Percentage
change
Data
Home excess return 0.473 0.515 8.858 0.861
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign excess return 0.473 0.485 2.452 0.241
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Adjusted R2 0.837 0.927 10.780 0.003
Panel B: Impact of cross-listing
Price change Return change
Foreign
sentiment
Data
Foreign
sentiment
Data
Cross-listing rm 4.487 3.418 -0.142 -0.194
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Table 5: Regularities and DOO Proxies. Panel A reports coe¢ cients from pooled Brennan-Cao
regressions where country groups are sorted by Low, Medium, and High absolute values of a1, from
initial time series regressions by country given by: NP it = a
i
0 + a
i
1Dt + u
i
t, where NP
i
t represents
US net purchases of country i, and Dt is a proxy for DOO at time t. Panel B reports estimates
from cross-sectional regressions of the absolute value of the di¤erence between home and foreign (US)
coe¢ cients on the absolute value of the DOO proxy coe¢ cients. The data are based upon initial
time series regressions of individual rm returns on their respective home and foreign returns and
DOO proxies that provide the cross-sectional series of coe¢ cients on home and US markets, dened
as Home and US , respectively. Panel C reports coe¢ cients on DOO proxies in regressions of non-US
stock returns on a constant, their home market return, on the foreign (US) market return, and on
various proxies, all pre- and post- cross-listing in the US market. In all panels, the DOO proxies
are: the di¤erence between the 75th and 25th percentile of forecasts for US GDP, Non-Residential
Investment, (NR INV), and Residential Investment (R INV); the variance of GDP forecasts (V GDP);
and the US and Global Sentiment Indices (US Sent and G Sent, respectively). Standard errors are
in parenthesis.  indicates signicant at 5% MSL, and  indicates signicant at 10% MSL.
Panel A: Brennan-Cao Coe¢ cients by Groups Sorted on DOO Sensitivity
Country Group GDP NR INV R INV V GDP US Sent G Sent
Group 1 (Low j ba1j) 0.005 0.019 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Group 2 (Medium j ba1j) 0.021 0.020 0.036 0.020 0.018 0.014
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Group 3 (High j ba1j) 0.096 0.087 0.097 0.106 0.084 0.140
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Regression of jHome   US j on DOO Sensitivity
DOO Proxy GDP NR INV R INV V GDP US Sent G Sent
DOO Sensitivity 0.178 0.113 0.378 0.107 1.312 0.291
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.014) (0.009)
Panel C: Changes in Sensitivity to DOO Across Cross-Listing Events
DOO Proxy GDP NR INV R INV V GDP US Sent G Sent
Before: bPRED -0.063 -0.041 -0.028 -0.078 -0.007 0.075

(0.140) (0.163) (0.161) (0.132) (0.139) (0.030)
Change: bPOSTD   bPRED 0.824 0.410 0.968 0.763 -0.142 -0.083
(0.289) (0.220) (0.293) (0.265) (0.233) (0.041)
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